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It has been proposed that the uniqueness of human cumulative culture may be attributable 
to humans’ greater orientation towards copying the process of behavior (imitation), 
compared with the products (emulation), resulting in particularly high fidelity transmission. 
Following on from previous work indicating that adult human participants can exhibit 
cumulative learning on the basis of product copying alone, we now investigate whether 
such learning involves high fidelity transmission. Eighty adult human participants were 
presented with a task previously shown to elicit cumulative learning under experimental 
conditions, which involved building a tower from spaghetti and modeling clay. Each 
participant was shown two completed towers, ostensibly built by previous participants, but 
actually built to pre-specified designs by the experimenter. This end state information was 
provided either in the form of photographs, or the presence of actual towers. High fidelity 
matching to these end states was apparent in both demonstration conditions, even for a 
design that was demonstrably suboptimal with regard to the goal of the task (maximizing 
tower height). We conclude that, although high fidelity transmission is likely to be 
implicated in cumulative culture, action copying is not always necessary for this to occur. 
Furthermore, since chimpanzees apparently copy behavioral processes and well as 
products, and also transmit behavior with high fidelity, the stark absence of unequivocal 
examples of cumulative culture in nonhumans may be attributable to factors other than 
imitative ability.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Many nonhuman species have been proposed to exhibit culture, in the sense of 
behavioral variation that is acquired and maintained by social learning (Laland & Galef, 
2009). However, most researchers are agreed that there are striking differences between the 
relatively simple, and somewhat rare, cultural behaviors observed in nonhuman animals, 
compared with the complexity and pervasiveness of human culture (e.g. Hill, Barton & 
Hurtado, 2009; Whiten, 2011). In this article we focus in particular on the phenomenon of 
cumulative culture, a process by which cultural change accumulates over many generations 
(Boyd & Richerson, 1996), resulting in what Tomasello (1999) has described as a ‘ratchet-
like’ effect, whereby favorable variants are typically preserved in the population until further 
enhancements are developed.  
Even amongst our closest evolutionary relatives, chimpanzees and other apes, there is 
little evidence of cumulative culture. Tennie, Call and Tomasello (2009) have contended that 
the cultural behaviors observed in chimpanzees are, “all things that individual chimpanzees 
could invent on their own fairly readily if all of the external and internal conditions were 
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right.” (p2407), thereby discounting the possibility of cumulative change to behavior as a 
consequence of  additive social learning. Although others have argued that there is some 
evidence of cumulative culture in chimpanzees (e.g. see Sanz, Call & Morgan, 2009, for 
compelling examples of complex, multi-stage tool-set use by wild chimpanzees), it is 
nonetheless accepted that such examples are rare, and that they still fall far short of the 
elaborateness of human culture (Whiten, 2011). 
One potential explanation for the apparent discontinuity between socially learned 
behaviors in humans and those of other species concerns the underlying learning mechanisms 
involved. A recent and detailed account of this view has been provided by Tennie et al. 
(2009). Tennie et al. (2009) proposed that human copying is primarily focused on bodily 
actions (processes), whereas the copying of other great apes is focused on physical effects or 
outcomes (products). The human focus on actions, they have argued, allows for faithful 
behavior transmission, and this high fidelity copying is suggested to be essential for 
cumulative culture to occur (see also Tomasello, 1999). We consider this to be a valuable 
proposal, but we believe that it may not be sufficient to explain the stark differences between 
human cumulative culture and nonhuman primate culture. In the current article we consider 
the various inferences on which this proposal rests. We begin by discussing the evidence for 
chimpanzees as process-oriented when it comes to copying, and also analyze the support for 
high fidelity behavior diffusion in chimpanzees. We then consider the evidence for non-
imitative (i.e. product-oriented) learning supporting high fidelity transmission, and discuss 
the support for non-imitative learning supporting cumulative culture. In addition, we present 
a new study, in which we investigate whether non-imitative cumulative culture in humans 
involves high fidelity transmission.  
 
Imitation and Emulation as Copying of Processes and Products 
First we begin with some definitions of the main learning mechanisms that we discuss 
in the current article. Imitation, as most have defined it, represents copying of actions, that is, 
process-oriented copying. Whiten (Whiten & Ham, 1992; Whiten, 2011), for example, has 
defined imitation as, “copying the form of an action”. This contrasts with product-oriented 
copying, generally referred to as emulation (Wood, 1989). In learning a new skill through 
emulative learning, there are a number of possible sources of information (Byrne, 1998), and 
correspondingly there a number of subcategories of emulation. Whiten (2011) recently 
distinguished three distinct types of emulation: object movement re-enactment (recreation of 
the movement of objects manipulated by another individual, as opposed to the actions that 
brought those about); end state emulation (recreation of the end state of another’s actions by 
any behavioral means); and affordance learning (learning about the physical properties of the 
objects through observation of another individual’s interaction with them, facilitating the 
achievement of a similar goal). In the current article we subscribe to these same definitions of 
imitation (process-oriented copying) and emulation (product-oriented copying).  
Clearly defining imitation and emulation is particularly important when considering the 
arguments that have been put forward to explain the rarity of cumulative culture in species 
other than humans. Experimental comparisons have been drawn between chimpanzees and 
humans (typically young children), some of which have suggested that humans 
predominantly copy actions, whereas chimpanzees tend to reproduce only the end states of 
demonstrations (e.g. Call, Carpenter & Tomasello, 2005; Tennie, Greve, Gretscher & Call, 
2010). Such differences have led some researchers to attribute the distinctiveness of human 
cumulative culture to such differences in imitative proclivity. Indeed, Tomasello (1999) has 
gone so far as to state that, “cumulative cultural evolution depends on imitative learning, and 
perhaps active instruction on the part of adults, and cannot be brought about by means of 
“weaker” forms of social learning such as local enhancement, emulation learning, 
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ontogenetic ritualization, or any form of individual learning” (Tomasello, 1999, p39; see also 
Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner, 1993). 
A variety of experimental methods have been used to distinguish relative reliance on 
imitation and emulation in social learning tasks. Two of the most prominent involve specially 
designed controls, referred to as “end state” and “ghost display” conditions (Hopper, 2010). 
In an end state control condition (e.g. Meltzoff, 1985; Call et al., 2005; Zohar & Terkel, 
1991), naïve observers are shown the completed form of a task, and sometimes the initial 
state too, but no information is provided about the methods used to reach that end state. Such 
a condition therefore provides a control for end state emulation, and also limited affordance 
learning. Tomasello (1998) illustrated emulation with the following example: “if a mother 
[chimpanzee] rolls a log and eats the insects underneath, her child will very likely follow suit 
… the youngster would have learned the same thing if the wind, rather than the mother, had 
caused the log to roll over and expose the ants.” (p. 29). The aim of ghost control experiments 
is to mimic just such a scenario and, accordingly, in a ghost control condition the objects 
move as if manipulated by a demonstrator, but crucially, this occurs without another 
individual actually performing those actions. This condition therefore provides a control for 
all three of the subcategories of emulation detailed above: end state emulation, affordance 
learning, and object movement re-enactment.  
 
Experimental Studies Distinguishing Imitation and Emulation in Chimpanzees 
Although some experiments using these methods have suggested that human children 
may copy actions better than chimpanzees (e.g. Call et al., 2005, mentioned above), we do 
not agree with the confident characterization of chimpanzees as product-focused, compared 
with process-focused humans. Our own research has shown that human children and 
chimpanzees will learn a challenging tool-use task much more effectively from live models 
than from a ghost display (Hopper, Spiteri, Lambeth, Schapiro, Horner & Whiten, 2007; 
Hopper, Flynn, Wood and Whiten, 2010). Furthermore, in the ghost display condition of  
Hopper et al.’s (2007) study, no chimpanzees learned how to operate the device in question 
(the “Pan-pipes” tool-use task, see also Whiten, Horner & de Waal, 2005). Although Hopper 
et al. (2007) tested chimpanzees individually in the ghost control condition, which could 
potentially confound comparisons with live demonstrations, Hopper (2008) reported a 
replication of this finding with chimpanzees tested in social groups, finding once again that 
no chimpanzee learned to use the Pan-pipes from a ghost display.  
Interestingly, the performance of the chimpanzees with regard to the ghost display 
contrasts quite strikingly with the performance of young children in an equivalent test using 
the same task. Hopper et al. (2010) found that up to 34% of three- to four-year-old children 
presented with the Pan-pipes apparatus learned how to operate it in a ghost display condition, 
although success in the live demonstration was considerably higher (77%). 
The apparent absence of emulative learning by chimpanzees in these Pan-pipes studies 
is difficult to reconcile with the portrayal of chimpanzees as product-oriented copiers. We 
suspect that the baseline level of task difficulty (see Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini & 
Hopper, 2009; Hopper et al., 2010), and the transparency of task affordances (see Horner and 
Whiten, 2005) may well be key factors. Previous studies which have reported emulative 
learning by chimpanzees (reviewed by Tennie et al., 2009) have employed tasks for which 
the physical properties and affordances of the task may be more clearly apparent, whereas the 
mechanism underlying the Pan-pipes task may be more opaque to chimpanzees. Consistent 
with this, using a simpler task (left/right sliding door), Hopper, Lambeth, Schapiro and 
Whiten (2008) found evidence for emulative learning by chimpanzees from a ghost display, 
although it is worth noting that direction copying in the ghost condition was very short-lived 
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in contrast with that observed in a corresponding live condition with demonstration provided 
by a conspecific.  
 
High Fidelity Behavioral Transmission in Chimpanzees 
Although we believe the ghost control studies by Hopper and colleagues indicate that, 
at least for some tasks, chimpanzees show process-oriented copying, Tennie and colleagues 
(e.g. Tennie et al., 2009; Tennie, Call & Tomasello, 2010) have maintained that chimpanzees 
solve the Pan-pipes task, and show a tendency to match the demonstrator’s method, through 
emulative rather than imitative learning. However, regardless of the mechanisms believed to 
be responsible, it is undisputed that the behaviors involved can transmit between 
chimpanzees with remarkably high fidelity (Tennie et al., 2009). Horner et al. (2006), using a 
lift/slide door apparatus, found that chimpanzees were capable of copying the actions of 
conspecific models with such fidelity that the two alternative techniques were each faithfully 
transmitted along chains of task-naive chimpanzees, one of which was four “generations” 
long, and the other five. The remarkable copying by chimpanzees has also been shown to 
allow introduced behavioral variants to spread through social groups under more naturalistic 
conditions, creating captive behavioral traditions (Whiten et al., 2005; Bonnie, Horner, 
Whiten & de Waal, 2007; Whiten, Spiteri, Horner, Bonnie, Lambeth, Schapiro, & de Waal, 
2007). Perhaps even more strikingly, it has also been shown that the power of these social 
influences is such that chimpanzees will continue to use socially-learned behaviors even 
when they are redundant (Price, Lambeth, Schapiro & Whiten, 2009), or when the learned 
behavior causes them to go against personal preferences (Hopper, Schapiro, Lambeth & 
Brosnan, 2011). Consequently, it would appear that, whatever the mechanism involved, for 
these tasks, chimpanzees seem capable of the sort of high fidelity transmission proposed by 
Tennie et al. (2009) to be vital for cumulative culture.  
 
Human Emulative Learning 
Studies of social learning in humans which incorporate ghost display and/or end state 
conditions (many of which have been carried out with children) confirm that emulation 
learning can result in high fidelity transmission. In Hopper et al.’s (2010) study using the 
Pan-pipes, children showed a marked tendency to use the method they were shown, whether 
this was by live demonstration or ghost display. Furthermore, in the simpler sliding door task 
reported in Hopper et al. (2008), children’s matching to the ghost displays, in contrast to the 
chimpanzees’, persisted beyond the first trial. Other studies using different tasks reinforce 
these conclusions. Thomson and Russell (2004), Huang and Charman (2005), and Subiaul, 
Lurie, Romansky, Klein, Holmes and Terrace (2007) all found evidence of learning from 
ghost conditions, in children aged between 14 months (Thomson and Russell, 2004) and four 
years (Subiaul et al., 2007). 
With regard to end state displays, Huang, Heyes and Charman (2002) found that 19-
month old infants who observed the initial state and end state of Meltzoff’s (1995) tasks 
produced as many target actions as those that observed a full demonstration or a failed 
attempt demonstration. Using a pyramid-building task, Murphy and Wood (1981; 1982) 
found that four- to eight- year old children were able to make use of photographs of the 
intermediate stages of construction of this object, resulting in considerably higher success in 
these conditions compared with a control group not shown these materials.  
 
Non-Imitative Cumulative Culture in Humans 
Given that emulation learning can result in high fidelity diffusion, there is no particular 
reason to believe that humans should be restricted to imitative learning when it comes to 
cumulative culture. Information about products should in principle be sufficient to allow for 
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ratchet-like learning effects. Consistent with this, we (Caldwell & Millen, 2009) have now 
shown that this is indeed the case in a study of cumulative culture in adult humans.  
Caldwell and Millen’s (2009) study represented a direct attempt to test whether 
cumulative cultural evolution could occur even when adult human participants are deprived 
of opportunities for learning by imitation and teaching, both suggested to be critical for 
cumulative culture (Galef, 1992; Tomasello et al, 1993; Tomasello, 1999). In a previous 
study, Caldwell and Millen (2008) had presented participants with simple tasks, finding that 
solutions to these tasks improved over laboratory “generations” of participants, with later 
participants benefiting from opportunities to learn from individuals tested before them. 
Caldwell and Millen (2009) made use of one of these tasks (paper airplane building) in order 
to test hypotheses regarding the learning mechanisms necessary for this observed cumulative 
improvement. Participants were given the goal of building a plane to fly as far as possible. 
Participants acted as a member of a chain of ten individuals, each of whom built their 
airplane after gaining information from the prior step in the chain. Caldwell and Millen 
(2009) manipulated the availability of opportunities for imitation (observation of other 
participants building), emulation (opportunities to inspect the completed products), and 
teaching (receiving verbal instruction from other participants), finding that each of these 
sources of information was independently sufficient for participants to show cumulative 
culture. It seems therefore that cumulative learning can be supported by purely product-
oriented copying, although it remains to be seen whether such an effect will extend to other, 
more complex (or perhaps less familiar), tasks. 
 
End State Copying in Adult Humans: An Experimental Test 
Rationale. The aim of the current experiment was therefore to assess the fidelity of 
product-oriented copying in a task known to elicit cumulative learning effects in humans. 
Although it may be clear that high fidelity transmission is possible on the basis of emulation 
learning, and that cumulative culture can be elicited by emulation learning alone, the more 
direct relationship between high fidelity transmission and cumulative culture remains unclear. 
Caldwell and Millen (2009) showed that cumulative culture could arise from emulative 
learning. However, it could be the case that high fidelity transmission was involved, but that 
this was possible from end state information. Alternatively it could be the case that high 
fidelity copying was not involved in transmission, but that cumulative learning effects could 
nonetheless arise. This latter possibility is plausible since cumulative culture necessarily 
depends on a balance between social learning and innovation (Tomasello, 1999). Thus the 
improvements in performance over generations documented by Caldwell and Millen (2008; 
2009) might actually have arisen as a consequence of relatively low fidelity transmission. 
To address this question, we tested adult humans using a spaghetti tower building task, 
for which Caldwell and Millen (2008) had identified cumulative improvement in tower height 
over learner generations (see also Caldwell & Millen, 2010). Furthermore, it appears that 
when participants copy in the context of this task it is used in a relatively strategic way, 
driven by a motivation to perform well in terms of the measured goal. In Caldwell and 
Millen’s (2010) study, there was evidence of greater within-chain similarity in a condition 
which introduced greater uncertainty about the final height measurement, compared with the 
(standard) immediate measure. In a follow-up study, Caldwell and Eve (in preparation) 
deliberately placed heavy emphasis on the goal measure of tower height, making this highly 
salient (demonstration towers were displayed alongside a tape measure and a sign clearly 
displaying the tower’s exact height), and incorporating a payment structure whereby 
participant fees were directly and steeply related to the final height. The intention was to 
determine whether participants’ apparent trade-offs between social information and 
innovation were truly motivated by a desire to perform well on the task. Once again, there 
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was evidence of similarity between participants’ towers and those they were shown, with 
greater reliance placed on the social information in a group who were led to believe that 
innovation might be risky. Consequently, we know that participants employ both social 
learning and innovation in taking part in this task, and that these are used relatively 
strategically in an apparent attempt to maximize final scores.   
Here, we used this task to conduct a direct test of the strength of copying from end 
states, extending to a comparison between a condition involving direct observation of 
finished products, and another which provided only indirect end state information (a 
photograph of a finished product). Strictly speaking, the studies conducted by Caldwell and 
Millen (2008; 2009; 2010) were not direct tests of copying, since there was no controlled 
manipulation of the task solutions to which participants were exposed (only variation in the 
spontaneous solutions of other participants). However, Caldwell and Millen (2008; 2010) did 
find evidence of some copying by analyzing the similarity of solutions by participants from 
the same chain, compared with those from different chains.  
The current experiment therefore represents a more controlled test of copying effects, 
as we have experimentally manipulated the designs to which participants are exposed, 
exploiting the logic of ‘two-action’ experiments (e.g. Whiten et al., 2005). This has permitted 
a more objective feature-based analysis of participants’ designs in order to document the 
presence or absence of specific elements of the two alternative demonstration towers. 
Importantly, however, it should be noted that the goal given to participants was identical to 
the goal given to the participants in the studies of cumulative culture using this task (Caldwell 
& Millen, 2008; 2010). Thus, the participants were instructed simply to build their own tower 
as tall as possible, and any matching to the demonstrated tower design therefore arose as a 
consequence of participants’ own decisions about how best to approach the task.  
 
 
Method 
 
Participants. Eighty adult human participants took part in the study, all of whom were 
recruited on campus at the University of Stirling, United Kingdom. They took part in return 
for a research participation course credit (for Psychology undergraduates only) or a £3 
participation fee. Fifty-one females and 29 males with a mean age of 22.9 years (SD = 8.5, 
range 18-62 years) took part. Ethical approval for this research was provided by the 
University of Stirling Psychology Ethics Committee. The procedure was explained to all 
participants in advance, and each gave written consent to participate. 
Apparatus. Each participant was given one 500g packet of spaghetti, plus 
approximately 80g of modeling clay (Early Learning Centre “Modelling Material”). 
Design and procedure. Participants were informed that the goal of the spaghetti tower 
building task was simply to build a tower as tall as possible using the spaghetti and modeling 
clay. They were also informed that they would be shown the solutions of two previous 
participants. 
In the ‘live’ end state condition, the participant arrived to find two spaghetti towers 
already completed, both of the same design, standing in the testing area. Although they were 
told that these towers had been built by previous participants, they had in fact been built by 
the experimenter to a specific design. In the ‘photo’ end state condition, participants were 
simply shown two photographs of spaghetti towers, displayed on the screen of a laptop 
computer, the participants again being led to believe that these were the efforts of the 
previous participants in the experiment. However, as in the live condition, these towers had 
also been built to a specific design by the experimenter. Additionally, in the photo end state 
condition, the towers were shown alongside a familiar object of typical size (a mug), 
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providing some information about scale. In both live and photo conditions, the participants 
were split into two further conditions (with 20 participants per sub-condition), determining 
which of two alternative tower designs they were shown.  
The two alternative tower designs were selected because they represented fairly typical 
tower types, based on previous experiments using this task, which relied solely on 
participants’ spontaneous design choices, without interference from designs created by an 
experimenter (Caldwell & Millen, 2008; 2010). These two designs were also distinctly 
different, with several features that could be identified to distinguish them. This permitted an 
objective coding scheme to be developed, based on these contrasting features (Table 1). The 
tower types were labeled as ‘Cubic’ and ‘Tripod’. Examples of each are shown in Figure 1. 
Demonstration towers were not built to precise heights, but since they were built to particular 
designs, the height of demonstration towers was relatively consistent. Cubic-type 
demonstration towers were approximately 44cm tall, and tripod-type demonstration towers 
were approximately 54cm tall. Further information about the differences between their 
features, and the coding scheme used, is provided below in the Data Coding section. 
Following five minutes’ exposure to the previous designs, participants were informed that 
they would be given a further five minutes in which to build their own tower. At the end of 
this period the experimenter took a photograph of the completed tower. 
 
 
Table 1. The coding scheme used to quantify the similarity of participants’ towers to the two 
demonstration tower types.  
 
Tower Feature Cubic Tripod 
Base contact 
Modeling clay and spaghetti 
(1) 
Modeling clay only (1) 
Base shape Square (1) Triangular (1) 
Lower level structure 
Vertical from plasticine 
contact points, not 
converging to single point 
(1) 
Approximately vertical 
converging to single point 
(1) 
Upper level structures 
Horizontal joins between 
vertical uprights (0.5), and 
vertical joins into single 
point (0.5) 
Single vertical element as 
highest level (0.5), with 
any/all upper levels as 
single verticals (0.5)  
Note. Numbers indicate the points attributed to towers displaying those features as their 
Cubic and Tripod feature scores. 
 
 
Data coding. Towers built by participants were coded according to the features they 
had in common with the two alternative demonstration towers. Four aspects were coded as 
either cubic-like, or tripod-like (Table 1). All photographs were coded according to this 
scheme by two raters working independently. Their ratings showed high concordance, 
suggesting that the scores could be assigned with high reliability using this coding scheme 
(Spearman’s Rho for cubic features: r = .967, N = 80, p < .0005; for tripod features: r = .973, 
N = 80, p < .0005).  
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Figure 1. The tower types shown to participants. Participants either saw two examples of the 
Cubic design (a), or two examples of the Tripod design (b). 
 
 
 
Results  
 
Matching to Demonstration Towers. Scores using the coding scheme described above 
were not normally distributed, so non-parametric statistics were applied throughout. In order 
to test the influence of demonstration tower types, all towers were given a score to indicate 
the proportion of features they had in common with a given tower type, in relation to the total 
number of features that they had in common with either tower type. Thus, proportional scores 
were calculated as: cubic-type features/(cubic-type features + tripod-type features). Scores 
calculated in this way therefore vary between a minimum of 0 (indicating a tower with only 
tripod-type features), and a maximum of 1 (indicating a tower with only cubic-type features), 
with 0.5 representing a tower with an equal number of cubic and tripod-type features. Figure 
2 displays the median cubic proportion scores, calculated in this way, for the four different 
demonstration conditions.  
In the cubic tower demonstration conditions, the median cubic proportion of 
participants’ towers was 1.00 for the live condition (first quartile = 0.69, third quartile = 1), 
and 1.00 for the photo condition (first quartile = 0.81, third quartile = 1). In the tripod tower 
demonstration conditions, the median cubic proportion was 0.08 for the live condition (first 
quartile = 0, third quartile = 0.44), and 0.08 for the photo condition (first quartile = 0, third 
quartile = 0.60).  
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Figure 2. Median proportion of cubic to tripod tower type features in participants' towers in 
live and photo end-state conditions. Error bars indicate first and third quartiles. N=20 in each 
of the four conditions. 
 
In the cubic tower demonstration conditions, there was no difference in the proportion 
of cubic to tripod features in towers made by participants in the live cubic and photo cubic 
conditions (Mann-Whitney U test: U = 196.5, n1 = 20, n2 = 20, p = .907). Towers from the 
tripod tower demonstration conditions also did not differ in the proportion of cubic to tripod 
features, across the live tripod and photo tripod conditions (Mann-Whitney U test: U = 175, 
n1 = 20, n2 = 20, p = .484). Scores from live and photo conditions were therefore combined 
when comparing cubic and tripod conditions.  
Participants who had seen cubic-type towers produced towers with a significantly 
higher proportion of cubic to tripod features, compared with those who had seen tripod-type 
towers (Mann-Whitney U test: U = 145.5, n1 = 40, n2 = 40, p < .0005), indicating a high level 
of matching to the demonstration towers (see Figure 2).  
Tower Heights. Tower heights were also non-normally distributed and were analyzed 
using nonparametric statistics. Towers built in the live cubic demonstration condition had a 
median height of 51.5cm (first quartile = 40.5, third quartile = 53.3). Towers in the photo 
cubic demonstration condition had a median height of 50.8cm (first quartile = 35.5, third 
quartile = 53.0). The median height of towers in the live tripod demonstration condition was 
77.8cm (first quartile = 69.0, third quartile = 83.5). For the photo tripod demonstration 
condition, the median height was 71.5cm (first quartile = 52.5, third quartile = 78.5). 
There was no significant difference in height between towers built in the live cubic and 
photo cubic conditions (Mann-Whitney U test: U = 197.5, n1 = 20, n2 = 20, p = .946). There 
was also no significant difference in height between towers built in the live tripod and photo 
tripod conditions (Mann-Whitney U test: U = 141, n1 = 20, n2 = 20, p = .110). Scores from 
live and photo demonstration conditions were therefore combined for the purpose of 
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comparing towers built in the cubic and tripod conditions. There was a difference in height 
between towers built in the cubic and tripod conditions (Mann-Whitney U test: U = 291, n1 = 
40, n2 = 40, p < .0005), with tripod condition towers being significantly taller. The 
demonstration towers in the tripod condition were around 10cm taller than those in the cubic 
condition (see Methods). However, participants in the cubic condition built towers that were 
no different in height from their demonstration towers (One sample Wilcoxon test against 
44cm baseline: Z = 1.560, p = .119), whereas those in the tripod condition built towers that 
were significantly taller than their demonstration towers (One sample Wilcoxon test against 
54cm baseline: Z = 3.408, p = .001). 
Amongst the towers built in the cubic tower demonstration conditions, there was a 
significant negative relationship between the number of cubic features (absolute scores from 
0 to 4, see Table 1) and height (Spearman’s Rho: r = -0.319, N = 40, p = .045). So in the 
cubic condition, towers that closely matched the demonstration towers were shorter than 
those that did not. The reverse was the case for the tripod tower demonstration condition, 
because in the tripod condition there was a significant positive relationship between the 
number of tripod features and height (Spearman’s Rho: r = 0.539, N = 40, p < .0005).  
Despite this, the absolute number of features matching the demonstration towers did not 
differ across the tower type conditions. Towers from the cubic demonstration conditions had 
a median score of 3.5 cubic features (out of a possible 4, see Table 1, first quartile = 2.1, third 
quartile = 3.5). Towers from the tripod condition had a median score of 3 tripod features (first 
quartile = 1.9, third quartile = 3.9). There was no significant difference between the tower 
type conditions in terms of the absolute number of features matching the demonstration 
towers (Mann-Whitney U test: U = 709, n1 = 40, n2 = 40, p = .375). 
 
 
Discussion 
 
We found a high degree of matching to the tower construction style in both the live and 
photo conditions. The degree of matching is sufficiently striking that it is important to 
emphasize once more that the participants in our experiment were never instructed to copy 
the towers that they were shown; the explicit goal was simply to build a tower as tall as 
possible. This relatively blinkered copying – only matching the tower form shown and not 
exploring alternatives – is reminiscent of the phenomenon of “overimitation” (Lyons, Young 
& Keil, 2007). Lyons et al. (2007) describe overimitation as, “persistently reproducing … 
unnecessary actions” (p19751). Studies of this phenomenon have so far shown that both 
children (Horner & Whiten, 2004; Lyons et al., 2007; Lyons, Damrosch, Lin, Macris, & Keil, 
2011; McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn & Horner, 2007; Nielsen and Tomaselli, 2010) and adults 
(McGuigan, Makinson & Whiten, 2011) are susceptible to copying irrelevant aspects of an 
experimenter’s demonstration in social learning experiments. In the current study we did not 
intentionally incorporate irrelevant elements as was done in these previous studies, however, 
since our study concerned learning from end states, it would not have been possible to 
incorporate irrelevant actions as the previous studies have done. All the same, although we 
did not set out to introduce superfluous structural elements to either design, it is clear that the 
cubic design was relatively inefficient with regard to the goal of maximizing height. The 
results concerning the heights of the towers built across conditions show quite clearly that the 
tripod design was a more effective approach, and yet participants exposed to the cubic design 
copied with an equivalent degree of fidelity.  
How can such apparently counterproductive copying be consistent with cumulative 
culture? As mentioned earlier, cumulative culture is dependent on both social learning and 
innovation, and as a consequence we might expect to see relatively low fidelity copying in a 
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task such as this, where it is theoretically possible to perform considerably better than the 
previous solutions shown. The high levels of matching observed in the current experiment, 
especially with regard to the less effective of the two designs, might be expected to inhibit 
ratcheting. However, it is worth pointing out that although our cubic design was less effective 
than the tripod design, it was nonetheless a perfectly viable solution to the task. From the 
participants’ point of view this would have been self-evident from the examples shown. In 
the absence of any information about the relative effectiveness of alternative designs, copying 
may have been regarded simply as less risky than innovation, the outcome of which would 
have been less predictable. The apparent strategic shifts between social learning and 
innovation observed in other studies involving this task, mentioned in the introduction 
(Caldwell & Millen, 2010; Caldwell & Eve, in preparation), provide some support for this 
interpretation. Indeed, it is possible that participants in our experiment interpreted the absence 
of any examples of a contrasting type as an indication that alternative approaches were likely 
to be less effective, since the previous participants had apparently decided to avoid them. 
Such inferences about the knowledge and rationality of the demonstrator may go some way 
towards explaining other results in the literature on “overimitation”, particularly given the 
otherwise rather counterintuitive finding that such tendencies appear to increase with age 
(McGuigan et al., 2007; McGuigan & Whiten, 2009; McGuigan et al., 2011). 
Interpreting high fidelity copying as cautious, rather than simply imperceptive, may be 
key to understanding its relationship to cumulative culture. As Tomasello (1999) has noted, it 
is faithful transmission which prevents “slippage backwards”, providing the stabilizing 
component of the ratchet. The cautious approach taken by our participants therefore seems 
entirely consistent with this view. All the same, this remains a relatively speculative 
interpretation of the current data, and it is possible that participants’ behavior in the current 
study was driven by lower-level mechanisms, such as priming of particular shapes and/or 
structures. 
At any rate, it seems clear that participants were not simply copying as a consequence 
of normative pressure. Deutsch and Gerard (1955) distinguished “normative” from 
“informational” effects, defining normative social influence as “an influence to conform with 
the positive expectations of another” (p. 629), and informational social influence as “an 
influence to accept information obtained from another as evidence about reality” (p. 629). 
Deutsch and Gerard (1995) suspected that both effects were at work in typical studies of 
conformity involving erroneous responses given by confederates. Described in terms of such 
studies, if affected purely by normative influence a participant would shift their response in 
line with those of the confederates in spite of a private belief that the confederates were 
mistaken. In contrast, if purely informational influence was involved, a participant would 
alter their responses because they were concerned only about making the correct response, 
and had concluded that the confederates must be right. Relating this to our experiment, our 
participants never met the designers of the towers that they were shown, and would have been 
aware that their own design, if shown to others, would be equally anonymous. There was 
therefore little or no motivation to override one’s own intuition in preference for adhering to 
what was believed to be an inferior demonstration design. 
To return to the theoretical points raised in the introduction, we can now further 
evaluate the proposal of Tennie et al (2009). As already noted, we do not agree that imitation 
(copying of processes of behavior) is key to cumulative culture, since chimpanzees appear 
capable of copying processes, and humans appear capable of cumulative culture in the 
absence of information about actions. On the basis of our results in the current experiment, 
we would suggest that the reason that humans do not appear to require imitation in order to 
engage in cumulative culture is not because high fidelity transmission is unimportant to 
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cumulative culture, but rather because imitative learning is not always necessary for high 
fidelity transmission.  
An important caveat must be added to this point however. Clearly, under many 
circumstances, imitative learning is absolutely crucial. Many behaviors (gestural 
communicative conventions, for example) leave no physical trace, and involve no movement 
other than the bodily action itself. The notion of an end state, or ghost display, is therefore 
meaningless in such contexts, and it is not possible to learn such behaviors through 
emulation. 
Also, as noted in the introduction, the transparency of the task is also very likely to 
increase reliance on imitation. Our task was highly transparent, in the sense it was possible to 
infer the intermediate steps needed to achieve the goal without necessarily observing them. 
But many other tasks are far more opaque in this respect. Hopper et al. (2008, 2010) have 
argued that imitation and emulation tend to be applied strategically, where tasks are opaque 
and transparent respectively (see also Acerbi, Tennie & Nunn, 2010). Hopper et al. (2010) 
found that children who saw a human model demonstrate the Pan-pipes task were more 
successful than those who saw a ghost display, suggesting that imitative learning was very 
helpful for this cognitively opaque task. It appears therefore that human children are capable 
of using different social learning mechanisms (imitation or emulation) depending on the task 
complexity and information available to them (Nielsen, 2006). But since chimpanzees also 
appear to be flexible in their use of social learning mechanisms (e.g. Hopper et al., 2007; 
2008; Horner & Whiten, 2005) this still fails to fully explain the apparent absence of 
cumulative culture in chimpanzees. 
The cause of the obvious differences in the richness of culture between humans and 
chimpanzees therefore remains an open debate, and we believe that alternative explanations 
should be considered. The apparent conservatism exhibited by chimpanzees within studies of 
social learning may provide an intriguing insight. Chimpanzees appear to show a striking 
tendency to perseverate with learned responses, often in the face of exposure to, or even 
experience of, more effective alternatives (Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008; Hrubesch, 
Preuschoft & van Schaik, 2009; Price et al., 2009; Hanus, Mendes, Tennie & Call, 2011;  
Hopper et al., 2011). 
It is important to note that the conservatism reported in chimpanzees appears very 
different from the “overimitation” observed in studies of social learning in humans, even 
though it may sometimes entail persistence with a socially learned solution in the face of 
individual experience of a more effective alternative (e.g. Hopper et al., 2011), which could 
be regarded as reminiscent of overimitation. As noted above, the high fidelity copying 
documented in the current experiment (even with regard to a relatively inefficient 
demonstration design) probably arises as a result of a genuine motivation to achieve an 
adequate, if not outstanding, score on the goal measure. Although it was not within the scope 
of the current study, it would be possible in future studies to show participants a relatively 
poor demonstration tower (e.g. cubic design) prior to their first attempt, and then show them a 
more effective solution (e.g. tall tripod, similar to those built by many of the participants in 
the tripod condition) to determine whether they would switch strategies. We would predict 
that human participants would readily switch to the more effective alternative. And yet, it is 
exactly this kind of judicious behavioral flexibility that chimpanzees appear to struggle with. 
However, it remains to be seen whether such effects apply across other primates, and 
indeed other nonhuman animals. It is possible that the conservatism of chimpanzees may not 
provide an explanation in and of itself, but understanding the reasons why it occurs could 
perhaps facilitate our understanding of the uniqueness of human cumulative culture. 
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To conclude, we believe that human cumulative culture, and high fidelity copying, can 
be supported by mechanisms like emulation, as well as imitation and teaching. Further 
explicit testing of such effects is warranted. 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
C.A.C., K.S. & C.L.E. were funded by a research grant from the Economic and Social 
Research Council (RES-062-23-1634). L.M.H. was supported by an NSF CAREER grant 
(SES 0847351, awarded to Dr. Sarah Brosnan), during the writing of the paper.  
 
 
References 
 
Acerbi, A., Tennie, C. & Nunn, C. L. (2010).  Modelling imitation and emulation in 
constrained search spaces. Learning and Behavior, 39, 104-114.  
Bonnie, K. E., Horner, V., Whiten, A., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2007). Spread of arbitrary 
conventions among chimpanzees: a controlled experiment. Proceedings of the Royal 
Society B: Biological Sciences, 274, 367-372. 
Boyd, R. & Richerson, P. J. (1996). Why culture is common but cultural evolution is rare. 
Proceedings of the British Academy, 88, 77-93. 
Byrne, R. W. (1998). Comment on ‘Chimpanzee and human cultures’ by Boesch & 
Tomasello. Current Anthropology, 39, 604-605. 
Caldwell, C. A. & Millen, A. E. (2008). Experimental models for testing hypotheses about 
cumulative cultural evolution. Evolution and Human Behavior, 29, 165-171.  
Caldwell, C. A. & Millen, A. E. (2009). Social learning mechanisms and cumulative cultural 
evolution: is imitation necessary? Psychological Science, 20, 1478-1483. 
Caldwell, C. A. & Millen, A. E. (2010). Conservatism in laboratory microsocieties: 
unpredictable payoffs accentuate group-specific traditions. Evolution and Human 
Behavior, 31, 123-130.  
Call, J., Carpenter, M. & Tomasello, M. (2005). Copying results and copying actions in the 
process of social learning: chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human children (Homo 
sapiens). Animal Cognition, 8, 151–163. 
Deutsch, M. & Gerard, H. B. (1955). A study of normative and informational social 
influences upon individual judgment. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51, 
629-36. 
Galef, B. G. (1992). The question of animal culture. Human Nature, 3, 157-178. 
Hanus, D., Mendes, N., Tennie, C., & Call, J. (2011). Comparing the performance of apes 
(Gorilla gorilla, Pan troglodytes, Pongo pygmeaus) and human children (Homo 
sapiens) in the floating peanut task. PloS ONE, 6, e19555. 
Hill, K., Barton, M. & Hurtado, A. M. (2009). The emergence of human uniqueness: 
characters underlying behavioral modernity. Evolutionary Anthropology, 18, 187-200. 
Hopper, L. M. (2010). ‘Ghost’ experiments and the dissection of social learning in humans 
and animals. Biological Reviews, 85, 685-701. 
Hopper, L. M. (2008) Dissection of observational learning among chimpanzees (Pan 
troglodytes) and children (Homo sapiens). PhD Thesis, University of St Andrews, UK 
[http://hdl.handle.net/10023/436]. 
Hopper, L. M., Flynn, E. G., Wood, L. A. N. & Whiten, A. (2010). Observational learning of 
tool use in children: investigating cultural spread through diffusion chains and learning 
Caldwell, C. A., Schillinger, K., Evans, C. L. & Hopper, L. M. (2012). End state copying by humans (Homo sapiens): Implications for 
a comparative perspective on cumulative culture. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 126, 161-169. (doi: 10.1037/a0026828). 
mechanisms through ghost displays. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 106, 
82-97. 
Hopper, L. M., Lambeth, S. P., Schapiro, S. J. & Whiten, A. (2008). Observational learning 
in chimpanzees and children studied through ‘ghost’ conditions. Proceedings of the 
Royal Society B, 275, 835-840 
Hopper, L. M., Schapiro, S. J., Lambeth, S. P., and Brosnan, S. F. (2011). Chimpanzees’ 
socially maintained food preferences indicate both conservatism and 
conformity. Animal Behaviour, 81, 1195-1202. 
Hopper, L. M., Spiteri, A., Lambeth, S. P., Schapiro, S. J., Horner, V. & Whiten, A. (2007). 
Experimental studies of traditions and underlying transmission processes in 
chimpanzees. Animal Behaviour, 73, 1021-1032. 
Horner, V. & Whiten. A. (2005). Causal knowledge and imitation/emulation switching in 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and children (Homo sapiens). Animal Cognition, 8, 164-
181.  
Horner, V., Whiten, A., Flynn, E. & de Waal, F. B. M. (2006). Faithful replication of 
foraging techniques along cultural transmission chains by chimpanzees and children. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 103, 13878-13883. 
Hrubesch, C., Preuschoft, S. & van Schaik, C. P. (2009). Skill mastery inhibits adoption of 
observed alternative solutions among chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Animal 
Cognition, 12, 209-216. 
Huang, C-T. & Charman, T. (2005). Gradations of emulation learning in infants’ imitation of 
actions on objects. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 92, 276–302. 
Huang, C-T., Heyes, C. & Charman, T. (2002). Infants’ behavioral reenactment of “failed 
attempts”: exploring the roles of emulation learning, stimulus enhancement, and 
understanding of intentions. Developmental Science, 38, 840-855. 
Laland, K. N. & Galef, B. G. (2009). The Question of Animal Culture. Harvard University 
Press: Cambridge, MA. 
Lyons, D. E., Damrosch, D. H., Lin, J. K., Macris, D. M. & Keil, F. C. (2011). The scope and 
limits of overimitation in the transmission of artefact culture. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B, 366, 1158-1167. 
Lyons, D. E., Young, A. G. & Keil, F. C. (2007). The hidden structure of overimitation. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA, 104, 19751-19756. 
Marshall-Pescini, S. & Whiten, A. (2008). Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and the question 
of cumulative culture: an experimental approach. Animal Cognition, 11, 449-456. 
McGuigan, N. & Whiten, A. (2009). Emulation and ‘‘overemulation” in the social learning of 
causally opaque versus causally transparent tool use by 23- and 30-month-olds. Journal 
of Experimental Child Psychology, 104, 367–381. 
McGuigan, N., Whiten, A., Flynn, E., & Horner, V. (2007). Imitation of causally opaque 
versus causally transparent tool use by 3- and 5-year-old children. Cognitive 
Development, 22, 353–364. 
McGuigan, N., Makinson, J. & Whiten, A. (2011). From over-imitation to super-copying: 
Adults imitate causally irrelevant aspects of tool use with higher fidelity than young 
children. British Journal of Psychology, 102, 1–18. 
Meltzoff, A. N. (1985). Immediate and deferred imitation in fourteen- and twenty-four-
month-old infants. Child Development, 56, 62-72. 
Meltzoff, A. N. (1995). Understanding the intentions of others: reenactment of intended acts 
by 18-month-old children. Developmental Psychology, 31, 838–850. 
Murphy, C. M. & Wood, D. J. (1981). Learning from pictures: the use of pictorial 
information by young children. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 32, 279-
297. 
Caldwell, C. A., Schillinger, K., Evans, C. L. & Hopper, L. M. (2012). End state copying by humans (Homo sapiens): Implications for 
a comparative perspective on cumulative culture. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 126, 161-169. (doi: 10.1037/a0026828). 
Murphy, C. M. & Wood, D. J. (1982). Learning through media: a comparison of 4-8 year old 
children’s responses to filmed and pictorial instruction. International Journal of 
Behavioral Development, 5, 195-216. 
Nielsen, M. (2006). Copying actions and copying outcomes: Social learning through the 
second year. Developmental Psychology, 42, 555-565.  
Nielsen, M. & Tomaselli, K. (2010). Overimitation in Kalahari Bushman children and the 
origins of human cultural cognition. Psychological Science, 21, 729-736. 
Price, E. E., Lambeth, S. P., Schapiro, S. J. & Whiten, A. (2009). A potent effect of 
observational learning on chimpanzee tool construction. Proceedings of the Royal 
Society B, 276, 3377-3383. 
Sanz, C., Call, J. & Morgan, D. (2009). Design complexity in termite-fishing tools of 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Biology Letters, 5, 293-296. 
Subiaul, F., Lurie, H., Romansky, K., Klein, T., Holmes, D. & Terrace, H. (2007). Cognitive 
imitation in typically-developing 3- and 4-year-olds and individuals with autism. 
Cognitive Development, 22, 230–243. 
Tennie, C., Call, J. & Tomasello, M. (2009). Ratcheting up on the ratchet: on the evolution of 
cumulative culture. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 364, 2405-2415. 
Tennie, C., Call, J. & Tomasello, M. (2010). Evidence for emulation in chimpanzees in social 
settings using the floating peanut task. PLoS ONE, 5, e10544. 
Tennie, C., Greve, K., Gretscher, H. & Call, J. (2010). Two-year-old children copy more 
reliably and more often than nonhuman great apes in multiple observational learning 
tasks. Primates, 51, 337–351. 
Thomson, D. E. & Russell, J. (2004). The ghost condition: Imitation versus emulation in 
young children’s observational learning. Developmental Psychology, 40, 882–889. 
Tomasello, M. (1998). Emulation learning and cultural learning. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 21, 703-704. 
Tomasello, M. (1999). The cultural origins of human cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Tomasello, M., Kruger, A. C. & Ratner, H. H. (1993). Cultural learning. Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences, 16, 495-552. 
Whiten, A. (2011). The scope of culture in chimpanzees, humans and ancestral apes. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 366, 935-1187. 
Whiten, A., Horner, V. & de Waal, F. B. M. (2005). Conformity to cultural norms of tool use 
in chimpanzees. Nature, 437, 737-740. 
Whiten, A., McGuigan, N., Marshall-Pescini, S. & Hopper, L. M. (2009). Emulation, 
imitation, over-imitation and the scope of culture for child and chimpanzee. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B, 364, 2417-2428. 
Whiten, A., Spiteri, A., Horner, V., Bonnie, K. E., Lambeth, S. P., Schapiro, S. J. & de Waal, 
F. B. M. (2007) Transmission of multiple traditions within and between chimpanzee 
groups. Current Biology, 17, 1038-1043. 
Wood, D. (1989). Social interaction as tutoring. In M. H. Bornstein & J. S. Bruner (Eds.), 
Interaction in Human Development (pp. 59-80). Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, Publishers. 
Zohar, O. & Terkel, J. (1991). Acquisition of pine cone stripping behavior in black rats 
(Rattus rattus). International Journal of Comparative Psychology, 5, 1-6. 
